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Savings Groups and Rural Financial Markets:  
Japanese and Thai Experiences
Ohno Akihiko*
Savings groups/credit unions serve as a financial intermediary within a village by 
mobilizing savings from rural households and extending loans to them.  This system 
often encounters an issue of excess funds when total savings exceed loan demands 
within a credit union.  In Thailand rural financial markets created by savings groups 
are segregated not only from those created by other savings groups but also from 
formal financial markets.  Excess funds become a critical issue for some savings 
groups and hinder their development.  On the other hand, in Japan, the market inte-
gration with respect to excess funds was pursued by organizing segregated rural 
credit markets (horizontal integration) and aligning rural credit markets with formal 
financial markets (vertical integration).  This paper discusses the contrasting evo-
lutionary paths of Japanese credit unions and Thai savings groups to offer practical 
insights for Lao savings group movement.
Keywords: Japan, Thailand, Laos, excess funds, market integration
I Introduction
Savings groups (hereafter SGs) offer a new approach for microfinance as referred to as 
microfinance revolution (Robinson 2001).  As mentioned in the introduction of this special 
issue, SGs and credit unions are used interchangeably in this paper.  The emergence of 
credit unions dates back to the nineteenth-century Germany and the movement had dif-
fused throughout the world including Japan.  The movement has long course of history that 
would elicit valuable lessons for the introduction of the SG in developing countries.
The aim of this paper is to provide an analytical perspective for the development of 
Lao Village Savings and Credit Groups (hereafter also abbreviated as SG) by examining 
the growth paths of Japanese credit unions and Thai SGs as they show a stark contrast. 
We draw focus to two critical issues that determine the growth path of SGs.  First, as the 
SGs accumulate savings, total savings tend to exceed loan demands especially among 
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active SGs, causing an excess or idle funds issue.  In Japan, excess funds provided 
momentum for the integration of rural credit markets into nationwide financial markets 
through policy interventions.  On the other hand, in Thailand rural financial markets 
created by SGs are segregated not only from respective SG markets but also from formal 
financial markets.  As a result, excess funds are likely to exert destabilizing influence on 
some of SGs.  This contrast provides important clues for Lao SG movement.  Second, 
the traits of agrarian society are likely to affect the growth path of SGs in a vital aspect 
of who take the initiative in the establishment and management of the groups.  This sug-
gests that unique policy interventions are quested for different countries, considering 
the features of respective agrarian society.  Note that the agrarian structure is related to 
the management issue within the SG, but not directly to the coordination among the SGs 
especially with respect to excess funds.
This paper is organized as follows.  In section 2, we present two perspectives for 
discussion: an integration of rural financial markets created by SGs with nation-wide 
financial markets, and the effect of agrarian structures on the functioning and growth of 
SGs.  Section 3 investigates Thai SGs mainly based on the household data collected in 
Northeast Thailand followed by an examination of Japanese credit union movement in sec-
tion 4.  Finally, section 5 summarizes the main findings and discusses their implications.
II Analytical Perspectives
The SG restricts the range of the operations to a small geographic area where sufficiently 
cohesive community mechanisms are obtainable for ensuring contract enforcement and 
quasi-perfect information about borrowers (Guinnane 2001).1)  Violating this principle 
imperils the viability of the SG as discussed by the sixth article of this issue by Fujita. 
The community mechanisms are where the SG can advocate its advantage over formal 
banks.  As the other side of the coin, a rural credit market created by a particular SG is 
not only segregated from formal financial markets but also segmented from other rural 
credit markets created by SGs in the absence of external coordination mechanisms.  Due 
to this feature of the SG, successful development of an SG inevitably eventuates in an 
issue of excess funds as total accumulated savings surpass the total amount of members’ 
loan requests.
There are two plausible strategies to deal with excess funds with respect to the 
1) Raiffeisen credit union confined its members belonging to a same Christian church community, 
parish.  In Japan, article 9 of the Japanese Industrial Cooperative Act of 1900 stipulated the coverage 
of credit unions to operate within a village.  Thai SGs have the same rule.
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market integration: organizing segregated rural credit markets created by SGs (horizon-
tal integration) and aligning those rural credit markets with formal financial markets 
(vertical integration).  The former involves a transfer of money from savings-surplus SGs 
to savings-deficit SGs, and a ruling body is required to adjust excess liquidity among SGs 
by endorsing the transferred money.  On the other hand, the latter implies a transfer of 
savings from SGs to formal financial institutions, especially banks.  It should be noted 
that this savings mobilization can be done without establishing branch networks of banks. 
These evolutionary paths are historically traceable in Japan.  In Thailand, however, little 
efforts have been made for the market integration.  Contrasting strategies taken in the 
two countries lead to different growth paths of rural financial markets.
The historical experiences of Japanese and German credit unions reveal that policy 
intervention to excess funds had facilitated the integration of rural credit markets with 
nation-wide financial markets.  However, little attention has been given to the point in 
the current literature on microfinance in developing countries.  The distinct strategies 
of Japan and Thailand on excess funds would provide suggestive hint for the development 
of Lao rural financial markets.
Also noteworthy is the fact that SGs range in function across different agrarian 
societies.  For example, agrarian society in pre-war Japan was basically landlord- dominated 
in that over 40% of farmland was tenanted.  It was landlord class that exercised initiative 
in the wide sphere of village politics including the foundation and management of credit 
unions.  On the other hand, Thai agriculture is dominated by peasant proprietors, and 
tenancy is modestly significant only in parts of the central plain.  In Northeast Thailand, 
an egalitarian village structure has traditionally precluded acquisition of new land from 
poorer neighbors (Hirsh 1990).  Thus, village leadership tends to be provided by an elder 
who is respected by the villagers (Seri and Hewison 2001) apart from his political and 
economic influence.  We need to explore how the agrarian structure of the respective 
countries affects their SG movement.
III Thai Savings Groups
III-1 Policy Intervention in Thailand
A major policy intervention in Thai rural financial markets was made in 1966 by the 
foundation of the state-owned Bank for Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperative (here-
after BAAC).  The BAAC had gradually expanded its branch network.  In 1996 (1970), 
the network had 535 (45) provincial and district branches and 875 (205) field offices.  As 
of March 2008, the BAAC had a rural network of 75 provincial offices, 962 branches, and 
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956 field offices.  It has expanded clients, outreaching approximately 98% of all farm 
households in Thailand in 2007 (Foundation for Development Cooperation and Banking 
with the Poor Network 2010).
The BAAC was unconcerned with saving mobilization during its initial phase, 
because its operating funds had been furnished with from commercial banks and inter-
national agencies (Myer and Nagarajan 2001).  In 1975, Thai commercial banks were 
regulated to lend 5% of their total lending of previous year to the agricultural sector. 
When the required amount was not disbursed, the remaining had to be deposited in the 
BAAC.  The rate of quota was increased to 20% in 1987.  The obligatory deposits from 
commercial banks had constituted the largest portion of the operating funds of the BAAC 
before the bank embarked on saving mobilization in 1989.  In the sense that the BAAC 
could have procured loan funds without being devoted to mobilize savings from rural 
households, the BAAC is said to have been heavily dependent on subsidies (Sacay et al. 
1996).  In the wake of the financial crisis of 1997, the bank came to pay more attention 
to prudential regulations and became fully committed to savings mobilization.
Establishing extensive branch network of the BAAC can be referred to as creating 
rural financial markets from above (a top-down approach).  Though the BAAC has deep-
ened its outreach gradually, it was far from sufficient in its early stages.  Thailand is 
subdivided into 76 provinces (changwat).  As of 2006 there are 877 districts (amphoe) 
except for Bangkok.  Thus, each district has almost one BAAC branch and field office. 
However, as there are more than 70,000 villages (muban) in Thailand, each branch/field 
office has to cover nearly 40 villages.  Thus, villagers’ accessibility to the BAAC is con-
sidered far from satisfactory.  In addition, the BAAC circumscribes the range of loans for 
production-oriented businesses, and does not serve as a consumption smoothing mech-
anism, especially for emergency expenditures.
To supplement the areas and loan demands that the BAAC did not cover, in 1974 
nation-wide movement to promote SGs for Production (klum orm sup phua karn-pa-lid) 
started under the guidance of the Department of Community Development (DCD) of the 
Ministry of Interior (hereafter, DCD SGs).  Though named as SGs for Production, DCD 
SGs serve loans for consumption purposes as well.  This is partly because the rules of 
group were determined by village members themselves.  As its loan funds are accumu-
lated savings of the members, loan purposes can be at their discretion.  The number of 
SGs showed a tremendous increase to 1,354 in 1980, and 9,927 in 1993.  This movement 
can be referred to as creating rural financial markets from below (bottom-up approach). 
SGs were seemingly expected to carry out complementary functions until the BAAC 
attains full outreach.  However, SGs still persist extensively in rural Thailand, despite of 
the BAAC’s current extensive outreach.  This is partly because SGs extend consumption 
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loans, and partly because some of the SGs offer emergency loans.  SGs function as a 
device for consumption smoothing, while the BAAC does not.  Consumption smoothing 
is one of the most expected function of SGs for the rural poor as is discussed by Fujita, 
Ohno, and Chansathith, the second paper in this issue.
III-2 Savings Groups in Northeast Thailand
This paper examines three SGs in Northeast Thailand that showed different performance, 
based on our household survey (N=676) conducted in 2006/07: A DCD SG in Khone 
Kaen Province (hereafter K-SG), SGs under the technical and financial assistance of the 
Foundation for Integrated Agricultural and Environmental Management (FIAM) in Roi 
Et Province (R-SG), and a successful SG with an eminent leader in Chaiyapoon Province 
(C-SG).  As the size of villages is small in Roi Et Province, R-SG contains seven SGs of 
adjoining villages.  Of the three groups, K-SG shows the poorest performance, while 
C-SG outperforms others.
The major characteristics of sample households are presented in Table 1.  Being on 
the river, village C has pump irrigation facilities owing to which double-crop rice and 
vegetable farming are widely practiced.  Villages R and C are in rain-fed areas.  In village 
R, livestock farming contributes a significant part of agricultural income.  However, the 
levels of cash income do not differ much among the three groups (Table 2).  Accordingly, 
durable holdings indicate little difference among three groups (Table 3).  Despite similar 
Table 1 Major Characteristics of Sample Households







K 188 17.14 0.24 27.32 10.4
R 250 16.41 0.81 48.31 2.8
C 238 10.43 3.72 52.40 24.4
Source: Surveyed by author.
Notes: a) 6.25 rai=1 ha.
b) Marketed rice denotes the proportion of paddy sold to total paddy production.
Table 2 Cash Income by Sources
 (1,000 baht)




Income Remittance Transfer Others
K 91.3 31.9 5.0 6.4 13.0 13.3 10.0 11.7
R 144.2 46.5 22.4 12.1 30.0 10.2 9.2 13.8
C 98.8 32.4 11.3 12.4 9.6 6.2 9.2 17.7
Source: Surveyed by author.
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wealth levels of households, the three SGs show contrasting growth paths.
(a) Stagnant K Savings Group
As the DCD program did not provide seed capital to SGs, the groups had to mobilize 
savings from the members for loan funds.  The members are required to deposit monthly 
commitment savings, called sat-ja (a Buddhist term meaning sincerity).  The monthly 
savings amount is fixed throughout a year so as to facilitate the calculation of dividends. 
The savings are treated as collateral to ensure loan repayments.
The SG shares some features with rotating savings and credit associations  (ROSCAs) 
in that they mobilize savings from their members and extend loans to them.2)  ROSCAs 
participants have to bid for a loan and wait for their turn to borrow.  Loans may not be 
available when needed, and savings may not be liquidated when needed.  In the SG, on the 
other hand, the members can obtain loans in a set day as long as they want to borrow.  In 
addition, the members are no longer required to borrow as long as they do not want to 
borrow.  Thus, the SG performs a financial intermediation function, particularly between 
cash-surplus and cash-deficit member households more than ROSCAs do.
In Thailand it is common that several SGs coexist in a single village, and villagers 
have memberships in a number of SGs.  For example, village K has four SGs: DCD SG 
established in 2000, Farmers’ SG established in 1994, DCD SG of Queen’s Birthday 
established in 1995, and the Thailand Village and Urban Revolving Fund known as the 
Million Baht Fund established in 2001.  All of these groups were established under the 
guidance of the government.
Farmers’ SG was introduced by the department of agricultural extension in order 
to promote the sericulture industry.  After a while, however, consumption loans came to 
be allowed.  As it has similar traits with the DCD SG and they have a majority of common 
members, they hold a joint annual meeting in April.  Both have commitment saving 
products.  Members are required to deposit compulsory savings with a minimum amount 
Table 3 Durables Ownership
 (%)
Group Vehicle Motorbike TV Refrigerator Telephone Washing Machine
K 17.6 76.0 97.4 77.1 55.1 13.6
R 18.4 90.4 98.5 84.3 58.5 14.9
C 19.6 77.2 95.0 76.9 53.7 22.4
Source: Surveyed by author.
2) In Japan, some ROSCAs transformed into credit unions.  Bouman (1995) observes the same.
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of 10 baht every month.  Considering that daily agricultural wage rate in the surveyed 
areas was 110 baht at the time of the survey, the amount of commitment savings is not 
a heavy burden for the rural households.  As there are no external shareholders, the 
members are the owners of the groups.  A major strength of the SG rests on the mem-
bers’ sense of ownership.  As the money loaned out is members’ deposits, members have 
an incentive to monitor their SG management and borrowers.  Larger external financing, 
on the other hand, would weaken the common bond of the SG and undermine its develop-
ment.3)  The dividend distributed to members is directly proportional to the amount of 
savings each individual has contributed to the groups.4)  The net profit of SGs calculated 
at the time of an annual meeting is distributed according to the group regulations.
The total deposits amounted to approximately 230,000 baht for the Farmers’ SG and 
50,000 baht for the DCD SG.  The average amount of savings per member is 2,000 and 
800 baht respectively, which are far from satisfactory when compared to the daily agri-
cultural wage rate of 110 baht.  As accumulated deposits solely constitute the funds for 
lending, and 70 to 80% of the members are said to apply for loans, average loan amount 
exceeds average savings only moderately.  This is what Coleman (1999; 2006) claims 
that the loans from SGs in Northeast Thailand may be too small to make a notable impact 
on the welfare of households.  It is possible to see this situation as one obtains loans from 
her deposits, paying interest.  The members seem to regard the SG as a device of self-
control or spouse control to refrain from impulsive spending.
Loans are made only once a year at the time of an annual meeting with one year loan 
period.  Interest rate is set at 3% a month on a simple interest rate basis and lump-sum 
payment is the rule.  Though the loan ceiling is set at the amount of borrower’s savings, 
loans three times more than borrowers’ savings are permitted as far as other members 
admit to be cosigners using their savings as collateral.  Cross collateralization is a general 
rule of the surveyed SGs.
There are different operations between Thai and Lao SGs.  As is so in Thailand, Lao 
SGs demand commitment savings with which they purchase shares.  One share is priced 
at 5,000 to 10,000 kip per month in general, and the members have to purchase at least 
one share every month.  However, Lao members can purchase as many shares as they 
can afford every month.  In addition, the members can apply for a loan every month at 
the time of a monthly meeting with a loan ceiling set at five times as much as the amount 
3) A typical polar case is Grameen Bank that relies on external financing almost fully.  Grameen Bank, 
thus, needs to equip several devices to maintain its effective functioning, such as peer groups to 
reduce lending risk.
4) Exactly speaking, the members purchase share rather than make a deposit.  One share is priced at 
10 baht per month.
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of their savings.5)  Loan period is three to six months.  Thus, Lao SGs are more flexible, 
and thus practical in operations than Thai ones.
Operational inflexibility of DCD SGs is partly because villagers having little book-
keeping experience to manage the groups.  The government did not provide any assis-
tance on work contents for the villagers.  Actually, as there is no stylized bookkeeping 
format, the record of deposits, loans, and repayments are often jotted down in a notebook. 
This causes troubles, for example, if a debt was cleared or not.  In addition, there are no 
internal and external auditing mechanisms to check group books.  This is apt to disturb 
members if the money they deposited is properly managed.  For example, once a rumor 
that the committee members embezzled the deposited money circulated among the mem-
bers of K group.  This triggered a run on the SG.  After withdrawing all the deposits, the 
members confirmed it was just a rumor and restarted to make deposits.  On the other 
hand, in Laos international NGOs have implemented training programs, and request Lao 
SGs to submit a quarterly financial report for monitoring.
The Million Baht Village Fund Program launched in 2001 is another reason behind 
the poor performance of DCD SGs.  The program injected a million baht (approximately 
US$22,500) to every village and urban community in the country as working capital for 
locally-run rotating credit unions.  Villages were required to set up village fund commit-
tee to run the fund, and to establish regulations in line with a guideline given by the 
National Village and Urban Community Fund Office.  By 2002, 92% of Thai communities 
had formed the committees, and by May 2005, 99.1% of all villages had the Million Baht 
Fund in operation (Arevart 2005).  According to Kaboski and Townsend (2009), the 
typical loan amount extended in the Million Baht Fund should be below 20,000 baht, and 
the loans need to be secured by guarantors among the members.  As no collateral is 
demanded, the Million Baht Fund restricts loans to productive purposes.  Loan duration 
is 12 months and the interest rate is 7% per annum.  In Village K, for example, all the 
households participate in the program.  The members deposit commitment savings (20 
baht) every month as a condition of receiving a loan.  Villagers seem to perceive the 
commitment savings as a membership fee to obtain a loan, because the amount of the 
commitment saving is negligible compared with the allowable amount of loan of 20,000 
baht.  In other word, villagers can access loans from the Million Baht Fund without size-
able savings.
In village K, the accumulated savings of the DCD SG and the Farmers’ SG (50,000 
and 230,000 baht) are far short of 1 million baht.  In addition, annual interest rate of the 
5) This makes Lao SGs ask for collateral that is usually durable goods such as motor bike, television, 
refrigerator.
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Million Baht Fund (7%) is significantly lower than that of other SGs (36%).  The emer-
gence of the Million Baht Fund, thus, debilitated villagers’ propensity to saving in the 
SGs.  Poor external assistance to train committee members and the emergence of the 
Million Baht Fund are likely to make DCD SGs inactive and fragile.
(b) R Savings Groups Supported by FIAM
FIAM, a Thai NGO established in 1988, started all sorts of assistances in Roi Et Province 
of Northeast Thailand, including the provision of toilets, jars for drinking water, lunches 
for local schools, and the establishment of buffalo banks.  In 1994 FIAM embarked on the 
rehabilitation program of DCD SGs with financial assistance from an American NGO, 
Catholic Relief Services (CRS).  FIAM conducted a training program on basic bookkeep-
ing using stylized account ledgers and passbooks for committee members.  The members 
set regulations by reference to the model regulations offered by FIAM.  The following 
discussion is based on the data collected from seven DCD SGs (group-1 to group-7) 
assisted by FIAM in Roi Et Province.
FIAM makes a loan of 1,500 baht per member as seed capital (external account) with 
the flat interest rate of 2% per month.  As the loans from CRS are provided in a series of 
six month cycles with lump-sum payments, loan period to the members has to be six 
months.  In addition to the external account, the SGs have internal account contributed 
by members’ commitment savings.  After the accumulated commitment savings come to 
satisfy the credit requirements of the members, the SG is declared graduation from FIAM 
assistance to be registered as a credit union.
All the seven villages have their own Million Baht Fund.  Its loan ceiling is set at 
20,000 baht and all the borrowers obtained the ceiling amount.  As one million baht was 
injected regardless of the village population, the SGs of villages such as groups 4, 6, and 
7 received a relatively intense injection in terms of per capita funds (Table 4).  This 
Table 4 Performance of Savings Groups Surveyed in Roi Et







1 1990 Excellent 121 58 987,815 17,031
2 1992 Excellent 86 109 1,137,810 10,439
3 1991 Fair 75 63 383,000 6,079
4 1995 Fair 43 38 116,503 3,066
5 1991 Fair 134 116 517,187 4,458
6 2000 Poor 50 27 39,210 1,453
7 1993 Fair 46 133 400,410 3,010
Source: Internal documents of FIAM.
Note: Assessment is conducted by FIAM.
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deteriorated the performance of DCD SGs.  For example, group-6 was established in 
1998 with 32 members, and FIAM started to support it in 2000.  In 2001 the Million 
Baht Fund started operating in the village.  This made the DCD SG unattractive to the 
villagers.  The members came to be less committed to the group, and five members 
withdrew from the group.  On the contrary, the SGs established far before the introduc-
tion of the Million Baht Fund and having relatively larger members, such as group-1 and 
group-2, have remained less affected by the Million Baht Fund and they showed favorable 
performance.
Generally speaking, the advent of the Million Baht Fund discouraged the members 
of DCD SGs from committing to their SGs.  FIAM, thus, lost its ballpark in Thailand, and 
decided to shift its major target areas to Laos.
(c) Thriving C Saving Group
While most of DCD SGs in Thailand have lost dynamism in the 2000s due to the imple-
mentation of the Million Baht Fund, some met with success.  C-SG was set up in 1987 
by the village elementary school principal, following the guidance of DCD.  Village C 
engages in vegetable cultivation that occupies approximately 70% of arable land of this 
village.  There are 14 pickup trucks in the village for transporting vegetables to Nakhon 
Rachasima, one of the major cities of Northeast with two hour distance by road.
The group had 597 members in 2003.  In 2004 the number jumped to 999 as the 
group admitted new enrollment.  As village C has 367 households, and approximately 
90% of village households have members, there are nearly three members per member 
household.  Non-member households are those who are affluent enough not to need loans 
from the group, those who are too poor to afford monthly commitment savings, and those 
resigned from the group.6)
The most distinctive feature of C-SG consists in the prominent leadership of the 
founder.  He set the strict group regulations, and an annual report of the group is distrib-
uted to the members to ensure transparency of group administration.  The report dis-
closes not only the detailed financial positions of the group, but also the names of group 
members together with the amount of savings, loans, and dividends.  The report pre-
serves the transparency of the group’s accounts.  In addition, group C supplies more 
flexible loan services in that the members can take out loans several times a year until 
the ceiling is reached.  Thus, C-SG has a similar management practices with Lao SGs 
than other Thai SGs discussed in this paper.
6) Twenty members resigned during the initial stage of the group development.  Though they proposed 
to re-participate in the group, their request was rejected.  This is because the group regulation 
states that the re-registration of a person who resigned from the group will not be accepted.
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Loan rate of interest is 1.5% per month (18% per annum) with 12 months loan 
period.  At the time of survey total savings amounted to 12.4 million baht, and per capita 
savings was approximately 20 thousand baht.  Thus, average amount of savings per 
household reached nearly 60 thousand baht.  Because of this immense amount of 
 savings, C-SG could have remained unaffected by the Million Baht Fund.
The immense amount of savings, however, causes a problem of excess funds.  As 
the annual rate of dividend is approximately 13%, which is significantly higher than the 
deposit interest rate of commercial banks, 0.75% per annum, the members are willing to 
deposit money in the SG.  This annoys the founder in that an issue of excess funds 
becomes more likely and a high dividend will not be assured anymore.  Though he pro-
posed the reduction of the lending interest rate at an annual meeting, the members 
expressed their opposition to it with a fear of lowering dividend.  To deal with an excess 
funds issue, C-SG put a 200,000 baht cap on savings per person.  At the time of the sur-
vey, five members had reached this limit.  However, the chairperson thought this was 
just an emergency measure insufficient to cope with excess funds properly.
III-3 Problems with Thai Approach
The Thai government took a twofold approach to the development of rural financial 
markets: the top-down approach through the BAAC, and the bottom-up approach through 
SGs.  However, the government has made little attempt to coordinate the two approaches. 
In addition, the markets created by SGs are separated from each other because no ruling 
body was established to integrate them.  The segmentation of rural credit markets is 
likely to exacerbate the problem of excess funds among thrived SGs.  Furthermore, due 
to the lack of policy coherence on the SG movement, there coexist several SGs within a 
single village.  This causes the problem of over-indebtedness or borrowing for reimburse-
ment purposes.
To deal with excess funds C-SG resorts to two measures.  First, as already men-
tioned, the committee set a ceiling on the amount of total savings.  Some of the FIAM 
assisted SGs have a similar regulation that sets 10,000 baht as a ceiling.  C-SG deposits 
nearly two million baht in commercial banks, but at the annual interest rate of mere 
0.75%.  Due to the absence of a ruling body, the saving capability of rural households 
cannot be parlayed effectively.  Second, C-SG embarked on a joint purchase business of 
agricultural inputs in 2001, using the excess funds.  For example, a member purchases 
a bag of chemical fertilizer at 420 baht on credit through the group shop, and half year 
later he pays 450 baht after harvesting paddy.  The 30 baht margin represents 6.7% of 
annual interest rate.  Though 438 thousand baht was applied to the joint purchase busi-
ness in 2004, the investment accounted for mere 3.53% of the total deposits.
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Table 5 shows the number of financial institutions from which the sample households 
obtained loans.  Approximately 80% of the households are indebted, and one-third 
obtained loans from several financial institutions.  Table 6 indicates the proportion of 
households that obtained a loan from the respective financial institutions.  In village K 
the Million Baht Fund seems to have crowded out the DCD SG, because the latter had 
mobilized relatively small amount of savings.  On the other hand, C-SG that accumulated 
huge amount of savings serves as a major financial institution in the village even after 
the advent of the Million Baht Fund.
The problem of over-indebtedness can be seen from Table 7 that indicates the 
intended allocation of windfall income (approximately US$100).7)  For comparison, the 
results obtained from Lao villages in Vientiane are presented for the village with (N=332) 
and without (N=259) SGs based on our survey conducted in 2007.  In Thailand, nearly 









0 21.9 20.7 16.8 28.2
1 41.4 39.9 39.8 44.5
2 30.5 32.4 36.8 22.3
3 5.8 6.4 6.0 5.0
4 0.4 0.5 0.8 0.0
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Surveyed by author.
7) The question is “suppose you get 5,000 baht as windfall income, how do you allocate the money 
among the followings.”  The options are indicated in Table 7.




Studied Savings group 14.9 61.2 51.3
Million Baht Fund 52.1 64.4 37.4
Other Savings group 9.0 7.6 4.6
BAAC 15.5 10.4 6.4
Commercial banks 10.2 19.2 11.4
Source: Surveyed by author.
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30% of windfall income is indicated to be allocated to repay debts.  Plural SGs in a single 
village are likely to jeopardize the disciplined saving behavior of the villagers.  In eco-
nomics, competition is supposed to yield favorable outcomes in the market.  However, 
competition may be detrimental to the borrower’s behavior in a microfinance market 
 (McIntosh and Wydick 2005; McIntosh et al. 2005).
By way of concluding this section, it must be emphasized that Thai SGs are mostly 
inactive due to inappropriate and inconsistent government intervention.  Some NGOs 
such as FIAM have acted as a substitute for government support, but only to limited 
areas.  Though leadership as observed in C-SG will be an effective solution for proper 
group management, we cannot expect such leadership everywhere at any time.  Thus, it 
is imperative that government policy intervention support and audit village SGs.
IV Credit Union in Japan
IV-1 Credit Union Movement in Japan
Modern credit union movement in Japan was initiated by the Industrial Cooperative Law 
of 1900 modeled on the German cooperative act of 1899.8)  The proportion of credit unions 
to total number of municipalities surpassed 100 at the end of 1910s (Fig. 1), indicating 
Table 7 Intended Allocation of Unexpected Income
 (%)
Thailand Laos
K R C Average With Without
Keep at Home 8.3 6.9 6.2 7.2 25.6 26.4
Commercial bank 27.7 22.7 30.9 27.2 1.2 2.8
Savings group 4.0 13.5 10.0 8.7 35.4 2.3
Gold 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.5 1.9
Livestock 18.9 17.1 4.7 13.9 7.9 20.9
Consumption 4.9 4.4 6.1 5.2 9.1 12.6
Debt Repayments 26.6 26.7 27.9 27.1 2.2 0.9
Others 8.9 8.4 14.0 10.4 18.7 32.4
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Surveyed by author.
Note: Commercial bank includes BAAC. “With” and “without” denote villages with and without an SG 
respectively.
8) Note that there were numerous informal SGs prior to 1900, best known of which is Hotokusha in 
Shizuoka Prefecture initiated by Sontoku Ninomiya.  They were registered as credit unions after 
the enactment of the Industrial Cooperative Law.
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that credit unions became widely prevalent across the country.  Unlike the SGs of Thai 
and Laos, Japanese credit union was allowed to serve three additional functions of 
 marketing, purchasing, and joint production union as industrial cooperatives.9)  Even in 
the case of combining two or more functions, however, credit union occupied a critical 
position.
Table 8 indicates the sources of borrowing by the rural households belonging to 
different economic strata in 1932.  A wealthier stratum of the agrarian society, the land-
lord class, could obtain bank loans, while poorer strata, inter alia the tenant class, had to 
rely mostly on informal financial institutions such as ROSCAs and individuals lenders. 
Credit unions occupied one of the major sources of borrowing across all the strata.  Fifty 
seven percent of rural households joined credit unions, and the proportions of credit 
union membership were almost same across strata except for miscellaneous that includes 
traders and non-farm producers (Table 9).  Thus, credit unions could have outreached 
the village poor.  The loan-to-savings (LTS) ratio (B/A), a ratio between the SG’s total 
loans and total savings, is below 1 for the landlords (0.65) and miscellaneous, while it 
is highest for tenants (1.65).  Accordingly, Japanese credit union had served as a finan-
cial intermediary between cash-surplus and cash-deficit households within a village 
community.
9) Purchasing unions dealt with various commodities including agricultural inputs and daily necessities 
at cheaper prices through joint procurement.  Production unions, later renamed as utilization unions, 
produced joint production by members.
Fig. 1 Growth of Credit Unions in Japan
Source: Sangyo Kumiai Chuokai (Various years).
Note: Growth of credit unions is indicated by the number of credit unions over the number of munici-
palities in Japan.
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Japanese credit unions procured their loan funds in a different manner from Thai 
and Lao SGs (Table 10).  By definition, internal funds should constitute a major part of 
loan funds of credit unions.  As to Thai and Lao SGs, members’ savings are the sole source 
of internal funds, except for the groups supported by Thai FIAM.  As members’ deposits 
are called shares, SGs are owned by the members.  They receive dividends according to 
the number of shares they hold.  On the other hand, a major portion of internal funds of 
Japanese credit unions at the early stage was paid-up share capital supplied primarily by 
the wealthier strata of the agrarian society—mostly landlords.  They also contributed 
funds by taking loans (debts loan) from local banks.  The members from relatively poor 
strata deposited savings with fixed interest instead of purchasing shares.  Thus, Japanese 
credit unions possessed similar features of the banking system.  The characteristics of 
Japanese agrarian society might predominate as the cause of this contrast.  The agrarian 
society in pre-war Japan was basically landlord-dominated as approximately 40 to 45% of 
Table 8 Sources of Borrowing
 (%)






Credit Unions 21.9 24.2 24.4 22.1
Bank 40.6 22.4 16.4 2.6
ROSCAs 15.8 23.8 27.2 33.1
Traders 1.8 3.2 5.0 8.9
Individual lenders 14.7 20.2 21.2 26.9
Others 5.2 6.2 5.8 6.4
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Norin-sho Keizai Kosei-bu (1938).









Households (%) 4.0 19.0 29.0 20.0 28.0 100.0
Operational Holding (Ha) 4.64 1.25 1.20 0.98 NA
Union Members (%) 5.0 24.0 34.0 22.0 15.0 100.0
Membership Proportion (%) 74 72 67 58 36 57
Savings per union (Yen) (A) 19522.2 28416.9 26392.0 78756.0 25167.0 107374.0
Loans per union (Yen) (B) 12682.5 30681.1 33267.7 130022.5 20622.0 110275.4
B/A 0.65 1.08 1.26 1.65 0.82 1.03
Source: Norin-sho Keizai Kosei-bu (1938).
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farmland was tenanted.10)  Under this skewed socio-economic status within a village, it 
was the landlord class that afforded initial funds to credit unions.
Several factors were likely to serve as triggers of organizing credit unions under the 
leadership of landlords.  First, the latter half of the Meiji era (1868–1912) witnessed an 
increase in the use of chemical fertilizer.11)  Purchasing chemical fertilizer was ranked at 
the top reason of borrowing from credit unions.  The use of chemical fertilizer would have 
not only stabilized livelihood of farmers, but also secured land rent for landlords.  Second, 
since around the turn of the nineteenth century, a number of local banks were established 
with a maximum of over 2,000 in the early 1900s.  Faced with severe competition for 
deposits, the newly-established banks were in the dearth of funds.  It is known that a 
great number of landlords who participated in the establishment of credit unions took a 
stake in local banks as well.  For such a wealthier agrarian class, credit unions were a 
device designed to transfer savings from rural areas to the banks.  Thus, the landlords 
were motivated to manage credit unions properly and made an effort for the accumulation 
of savings by persuading community members to save money at credit unions.  For 
example, Kanai credit union in Yamagata prefecture set the 20th of each month as the 
day of deposits.  Rotatory persons in charge of every hamlet of the village collected 
deposits from the members and brought them to the business premise of the credit union 
(Sangyo Kumiai Chuokai 1906).
The literature on Japanese credit unions mostly claims that the government had 
provided little support at the initial stage of credit union movement.  However, this does 
10) The rate hit a peak at 48% around 1930 (Ando 1979).
11) The proportion of nitrogen input from chemical fertilizer to total nitrogen input for agriculture was 
15.7% in 1898–1907, 30.4% in 1908–17, 42.1% in 1918–27, and 46.2 % in 1928–37 (Hayami 1973). 
The other source of nitrogen is natural manure.





Loan TotalCapital Stock 
Paid-in Reserves Savings
1905 56.6 16.4 18.0 9.0 100.0
1910 38.1 16.8 37.4 7.7 100.0
1915 29.2 21.4 39.0 10.5 100.0
1920 15.7 14.2 63.3 6.9 100.0
1925 15.0 9.5 69.0 6.5 100.0
1930 13.6 14.2 65.5 6.8 100.0
1935 11.6 11.5 70.8 6.1 100.0
Source: Sangyo Kumiai Chuokai (Various years).
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not imply that the government was indifferent to the movement.  The government 
intended to pave a way to facilitate the credit union movement and to integrate the seg-
mented credit markets into nation-wide financial markets.
After the enactment of the Industrial Cooperative Act of 1900, the Ministry of Agri-
culture and Commerce provided the prefectural governments with the model form of 
cooperative regulation, and county chiefs organized the campaigns for cooperative move-
ment.  Industrial cooperatives began to be organized under the guidance of the heads of 
regional governments.
The Central Cooperative Federation (hereafter Central Federation) was founded in 
1905 as a voluntary association under the leadership of Tosuke Hirata, ex-Minister of 
Agriculture and Commerce, who laid the foundation of the Industrial Cooperative Law. 
The revised Industrial Cooperative Law (1909) admitted the federation as a judicial entity. 
In addition, the regional cooperative federations as the second tier were organized across 
the country.  The areas covered by the second tier federations did not coincide with the 
realm of prefectures in the first place.  After alignment efforts were made, each prefecture 
came to have a single second tier cooperative.  Thus the second tier is referred to as 
Prefectural Federation, hereafter.
The Central Federation issued varieties of publications to facilitate cooperative 
movement.  For example, it launched a monthly magazine Sangyo Kumiai [Industrial 
Cooperative] in 1905 to bring enlightenment to the movement with a main focus on credit 
unions.  It contained articles on the management of credit unions such as accounting 
system, the criteria of creditworthiness, and financial viability of the loan applicants.  To 
facilitate the movement, the association started to make annual honorable recognition of 
distinguished cooperative associations in 1910.  In the first round, 51 cooperatives were 
commended, of which 48 had credit unions.12)
IV-2 Financial Markets Integration and Excess Funds
As long as credit unions are based on rural communities, credit unions in Japan had to be 
compartmentalized in the early phase of development as is so the cases of the SGs in 
Thailand and Laos.  The integration approach came to be attached weight as an excess 
funds issue came to the fore.13)  As savings turned out a major component of loan funds 
in the mid-1910s (Table 10), the average loans-to-savings (LTS) ratio declined drastically 
12) The association disseminated their operation information through the report titled Kensho Sangyo 
Kumiai [Commended Industrial Cooperative].
13) The postal savings system that started in 1875 played another vital role in mobilizing savings from 
the rural sector in Japan.  Due to a space constraint and the fact that the system did not offer loan 
services, we make no direct reference to it.
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to have remained below 1 since 1917 (Fig. 2), suggesting the emergence of excess 
funds.14)
The declining trend differed among regions as is shown in Fig. 3.  For presentation 
ease, the figure includes only major zones of Japan: agriculturally backward zones of 
Tohoku (Northeast) and Kanto (Tokyo and its vicinity), and agriculturally advanced zones 
of Kinki (Osaka and its vicinity) and Western Japan.  The LTS ratios were high in all the 
zones in the initial stage, because savings accounted for only a smaller portion of loan 
funds.  However, the ratios declined drastically, especially in Kinki and Western Japan 
of agriculturally advanced zones.  On the other hand, the ratio had remained above 1 for 
long in agriculturally backward zones of Tohoku and Kanto, suggesting the dearth of 
funds.  This quested for horizontal integration of credit unions to coordinate demand and 
supply within and among prefectures.  The Central Federation advocated horizontal 
integration of credit unions by establishing the Central Cooperative Bank as early as in 
1906, partly in response to the request made by credit unions in Tohoku zone suffering 
from the dearth of funds (Norin Chuo Kinko 1973).
The integration system was composed of three tires: individual credit unions as a 
bottom tier, Prefectural Federations as a second tier, and the Central Cooperative Bank 
as an umbrella institution.  Through the horizontal integration system, credit unions 
started to deposit their excess funds to Prefectural Federations.  The prefectural fed-
14) Note that the ratios are not more than 1 in the credit unions of Lao and Thailand, because their 
funds for loans are furnished with almost solely members’ savings.
Fig. 2 LTS Ratio of Japanese Credit Unions
Source: Sangyo Kumiai Chuokai (Various years).
Savings Groups and Rural Financial Markets 33
erations adjusted demand and supply of credit among their member credit unions.  As 
Fig. 4 shows, however, the LTS ratio of Prefectural Federations in Kinki and Western 
Japan were below 1 from the start.  In the 1920s more than half of excess funds of credit 
unions were deposited at banks (Table 11), partly because banks offered favorable deposit 
interest rate for credit unions to mobilize excess funds.  As the overall LTS ratio had 
come lower than 1 as early as 1917 (Fig. 2), the financial position of credit unions turned 
out over-savings as a whole.  After that, bond especially that issued by the government 
became another investment outlet of excess funds, not only for individual credit unions, 
but also for Prefectural Federations and the Central Federation.  As a consequence, a 
horizontal integration approach facilitated the embedment of segmented rural credit 
 markets into nation-wide financial markets, attaining vertical integration.  In this 
sense, Japanese credit unions could grow without a sizable capital infusion from the 
government.15)
IV-3 Nation-wide Rural Development Program in Japan and Thailand
Excess funds in Japanese rural credit markets were transferred to nation-wide financial 
Fig. 3 Zone-wise LTS Ratio of Credit Unions
Source: Sangyo Kumiai Chuokai (Various years).
15) Note that this paper does not discuss overall resource flow between agriculture and industry.  For 
details, please refer to Ishikawa (1967).
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markets through the government bond market and deposits in commercial banks after 
the second half of the 1910s.  However, this does not imply unidirectional cash flow from 
credit unions to nation-wide financial markets.  As a final point, it may be worth mention-
ing about nation-wide rural development programs through rural financial markets in 
Japan and Thailand.  Their distinct implementation processes reflect the features of 
policy intervention into rural financial markets in the two countries.
The rural economy of Japan was seriously damaged by the Great Depression of 1929. 
The government embarked on the Economic Rehabilitation Movement (Keizai Kosei 
Undo) in 1932 to recover devastated rural economy.  It was a bottom-up program in that 
the village communities had to submit a rehabilitation draft and that they were respon-
sible for implementing the plan.  Credit unions were expected to be a pivotal actor for a 
capital infusion in the vertically integrated financial system.  In 1933 the first five-year 
plan for the intensification of industrial cooperatives was launched.  The plan intended 
to set up industrial cooperatives every village and those fully equipped with the four 
functions of credit, marketing, purchasing, and production.  Thus, the program is said to 
pursue comprehensive development of rural economy.  In addition, the government 
Fig. 4 Zone-wise LTS Ratio of Prefectural Federations
Source: Sangyo Kumiai Chuokai (Various years).
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promulgated the Debt Clearance Act in 1933 to rehabilitate debt-laden farmers sprung 
up by the Great Depression.  Debt clearance unions were set up across the country, and 
credit unions assumed a vital role in debt clearance.  Thus, credit unions embedded in 
the nation-wide financial markets were vital actors of a bottom-up government policy for 
the development of rural economy.
The Million Baht Fund program of Thailand launched in 2001 is the largest scale 
government microfinance initiative in the world.  Village communities were required to 
set up a local committee to run the fund and to draw up the rules for operations such as 
interest rate, loan duration, maximum loan size, and objectives.  Unlike the Economic 
Rehabilitation Movement of Japan, existing SGs were kept out of the loop in the program. 
Though the Million Baht Fund demands commitment savings from members as rotating 
credit union, the amount, normally 20 baht per month, is virtually negligible compared 
with the average loan amount of 20,000 baht.  In addition, the committee is not allowed 
to handle funds directly, but is required to open an account at the BAAC.16)  A million 
baht was disbursed to and held at the BAAC.  Thus, the Million Baht Fund should be 
characterized as rural financial institutions based on a top-down approach.
The two nation-wide rural development programs show a distinct contrast in terms 
of a bottom-up and a top-down approach.  The contrast is in line with the distinct evolu-
tionary path of rural credit markets of the two countries.
16) The accounts of urban communities were opened at the Government Savings Bank.






Federation Bank Others Total
1927 15.85 1.69 27.18 53.81 1.47 100.00
1928 14.07 2.22 29.39 52.98 1.33 100.00
1929 15.68 2.34 29.84 50.67 1.47 100.00
1930 21.22 3.38 30.79 43.19 1.42 100.00
1931 24.65 3.98 33.00 36.90 1.46 100.00
1932 25.13 4.50 36.34 32.72 1.32 100.00
1933 19.87 3.69 42.13 33.07 1.23 100.00
1934 20.97 3.79 42.21 31.72 1.31 100.00
1935 21.47 3.93 41.54 31.62 1.44 100.00
Source: Norin Chuo Kinko (1973).
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V Conclusion
Creating rural financial markets is challenging policy intervention for decades in develop-
ing countries.  While poverty alleviation has been paid attention somewhat overly in the 
literature of rural financial markets, little was discussed on the integration of rural credit 
markets into nation-wide financial markets.  The integration concerns the system of 
saving mobilization from the rural sector to fuel industrialization and the infusion of 
capital into the rural sector to address the issues of rural development or rehabilitation. 
Though community mechanisms provide a basis for sustained management and growth 
of the SGs, the mechanisms cannot cope with coordination of the SGs for establishing 
integrated financial markets.  This paper discussed the contrasting evolutionary paths of 
Japanese credit unions and Thai SGs to offer practical insights for Lao SG movement.
We traced the history of credit unions of Japan and SGs of Thailand with a focus on 
the integration process.  Though both countries have conducted policy intervention to 
create rural financial markets, their growth tracks showed a contrasting picture in that 
Japan pursued the bottom-up approach while Thailand employed the top-down approach. 
As rural institutions including credit unions are deeply embedded in distinct agrarian 
structure, any investigation neglecting the embeddedness would lead to incomplete 
policy implications.  In addition, the Japanese government attempted to integrate the 
segmented rural financial markets of credit unions horizontally and vertically, while the 
Thai government has been almost indifferent to the integration.  The outcomes of these 
approaches would offer practical insights into the development of rural financial markets 
in developing countries including Laos.
As mentioned Lao SG movement was initiated by Thai NGO (FIAM) that has pro-
moted microfinance in Northeast Thailand, following the village bank methodology of the 
Foundation for International Community Assistance (FINCA).  FIAM shifted its area for 
major activity to Laos in the latter half of the 1990s.  Though Lao SGs are structured in 
accordance with the Thai FIAM model, they show clear distinctions.  First, while Thai 
FIAM offers seed money to the assisting SGs, Lao FIAM does not or offers only limited 
amount if any to the SGs.  Lao SGs, thus, had to mobilize internal savings for working 
operational funds from the start.  Second, Thai SGs are stand-alone without ensuring any 
authorized formal linkage with either other SGs or formal banks, while Laos started to 
connect themselves to transfer excess liquidity to the SGs in the dearth of funds since 
2007, even though with a limited effect.
Lao SG movement started to pursue horizontal integration with leaving vertical 
integration untouched.  In this sense Japanese experiences would provide more relevant 
framework for Lao SGs.  However, it should be noted that Lao agrarian society has more 
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similar features with Thai society rather than pre-war Japanese agrarian society in that 
Lao and Thailand farmers are more egalitarian in landholdings than landlord-dominated 
Japanese society.  Considering the fact that Japanese landlords took positive initiative in 
creating rural financial markets in pre-war Japan, policy interventions including NGOs 
support come to be critically important for the development of Lao SGs.
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